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Two-EDGED SwoRDS, DANGEROUSNESS, AND EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN CAPITAL SENTENCING

Robert F. Schopp*

I. INTRODUCTION

A series of court opinions and a related line of commentary draw attention to the need for further inquiry regarding the defensible interpretation and application of dangerousness as a consideration in capital sentencing. The court opinions raise questions regarding the manner in which
sentencers should interpret and weigh dangerousness as a factor in capital
sentencing. In Penry v. Lynaugh,' the Supreme Court overturned the
capital sentence of a mentally retarded offender under the special issue
sentencing standard in force in Texas at that time. 2 This procedure required that the sentencing jury answer two sentencing questions regarding
deliberateness and dangerousness. The Court's reasoning included reference to the possibility that the evidence of mental retardation that Penry
offered as mitigating might function as a two-edged sword in that it might
be seen as mitigating regarding culpability and as aggravating regarding
dangerousness, but the Court's reasoning regarding this matter was not
entirely clear.3
The majority opinion in Atkins v. Virginia referred to the Penry concern that proffered mitigating evidence regarding mental retardation might
function as a two-edged sword.4 The opinion provides no reasoning that
explains why such a finding would violate Eighth Amendment doctrine.
Rather, the opinion simply refers back to the Penry opinion. 5 Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Missouri applied an analysis modeled on the Atkins
opinion to a juvenile offender. 6 The opinion includes reference to the Atkins opinion's concern regarding the possibility that evidence offered as
*
Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology and Philosophy at the University of Nebraska.
I am grateful for thoughtful comments from my colleagues at the University of Nebraska and from
participants in annual meetings of the American Psychology-Law Society and of the Western Society
of Criminology.
1.
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
2.
Id. The holding of this case regarding capital punishment of mentally retarded offenders was
overturned in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In this Article, I address the reasoning regarding evidence that can constitute a two-edged sword rather than the holding regarding capital punishment and mentally retarded offenders.
3.
Id. at 322-28.
4.
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
5.
Id.at 321.
6.
Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003).
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mitigating at sentencing could function as a two-edged sword as part of
the reasoning supporting the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment categorically precludes capital punishment of offenders who commit capital
crimes as juveniles. The Simmons opinion resembles the Atkins opinion,
however, in that it provides no clear explanation why it would violate constitutional doctrine for a sentencer to conclude that evidence offered as
mitigating regarding culpability also carries aggravating weight regarding
dangerousness.7 In short, the Peny, Atkins, and Simmons opinions raise
concerns regarding the possibility that evidence relevant to mental retardation or youth offered in mitigation might serve as a two-edged sword in
that a sentencer might interpret it as aggravating regarding dangerousness,
but these opinions do not clearly explain why this would raise a constitutional concern.
The related line of commentary addresses the appropriate role of expert testimony regarding dangerousness as a consideration in capital sentencing. Recent articles raise a series of questions regarding the appropriate range and content of expert testimony applying risk assessment in capital sentencing hearings. These articles address concerns including but not
limited to the following: (1) the application of the Psychopathy ChecklistRevised (PCL-R) or other risk assessment instruments to risk assessment
for the purpose of capital sentencing; (2) the significance of base-rates of
violence for assessment of risk in prison; (3) the relevance of prior violence in the community to the risk of violence in prison; (4) the significance of altered circumstances in the form of high security prison settings
such as supermax or lock down facilities for the reliability of risk assessments based on prior conduct in different circumstances.8
The questions raised in these articles are related to the previously
identified court opinions in that the appropriate range and form of expert
testimony depends partially upon the most defensible interpretation of the
significance of dangerousness in capital sentencing. How should sentencers and courts address proffered mitigating evidence that might reasonably be interpreted as a two-edged sword in that a reasonable sentencer
could consider it mitigating because it renders the offender less culpable
than other offenders who commit similar offenses but aggravating because
it supports the conclusion that the offender presents a substantial threat of
7.
Id. at 411-13. In Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court in precluding capital punishment of juvenile offenders, but the Court did not
explicitly address the two-edged sword concern. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). The majority opinion mentioned the prosecutor's argument that referred to Simmons' age as "scary" (558) and characterized this
argument as "overreaching" (573). The opinion provides no reasoning that explains why such argument is overreaching. Some language suggests that the majority understood this argument as suggesting that the jury should consider Simmons's age as aggravating and not as mitigating. This interpretation resembles the Penry opinion in that it raises the concern that the evidence was not an effective
two-edged sword because it prevented the jury from applying the mitigating edge. See Lncf1Part n1.
8.
See mfm Part VA discussing these objections and sources.
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further violence? What is the justificatory function of dangerousness in
capital sentencing under current legal doctrine, and what type of psychological expert testimony regarding risk assessment falls within the range of
appropriate testimony as defined by this function? This Article presents an
analysis intended to advance our understanding of these questions. It does
not purport to provide complete resolution, but it suggests a framework
for further inquiry. As is often the case regarding capital punishment,
specific questions reveal underlying concerns involving the intersection of
constitutional interpretation, moral justification, empirical premises, and
the relationships among these three domains. The analysis presented here
pursues clarification of some aspects of this integrated inquiry.
The analysis proceeds in the following manner. Part II examines the
Supreme Court opinions addressing the two-edged sword concern, and
Part III discusses this concern in context of the more general doctrine requiring that punishment serve some legitimate penal purpose. Part IV
raises some central questions regarding dangerousness as a sentencing
factor, and Part V examines a more general legal conception of dangerousness. Part VI applies this conception of dangerousness to capital sentencing. Part VII examines the appropriate form and range of expert testimony regarding dangerousness in this context, and Part VIII concludes
the analysis.

II. THE COURT OPINIONS ADDRESSING THE TWO-EDGED SWORD
The Penry opinion was the only opinion of the aforementioned three
that provided any relevant reasoning regarding the two-edged sword concern. In that opinion, the Court addressed a sentencing procedure in
which the sentencing jury was asked to answer two special issues, formulated as questions regarding deliberateness and dangerousness, addressing
respectively the offender's culpability for the offense and the risk the offender would continue to pose. 9 The Court recognized that reasonable
jurors might have believed that Penry's retardation rendered him less culpable than other offenders who committed otherwise comparable offenses
but conclude that they were precluded from giving effect to that mitigating
evidence in their response to the deliberateness special issue because Penry
acted deliberately as that term is ordinarily understood.10 The Court also
recognized that reasonable jurors might conclude that the dangerousness
special issue provided no opportunity to give effect to the mitigating significance of mental retardation. 1" Furthermore, those jurors might conclude that the evidence of retardation had aggravating weight under this
9.
case).
10.
11.

Pemy, 492 U.S. at 310 (the third special issue addressing provocation did not apply in this
Id. at 322-23.
Id.
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special issue in that it provided reason to believe that Penry would remain
dangerous because he would not learn from experience. 2
Thus, reasonable jurors might conclude that Penry's mental retardation rendered him less culpable but more dangerous than other offenders
who commit similar crimes. They might also conclude that the dangerousness special issue would allow them to give effect to the aggravating
significance of increased risk but that neither special issue provided the
opportunity to give effect to the mitigating significance of reduced culpability. In short, reasonable jurors could conclude that Penry's mental retardation was a substantive two-edged sword in that it rendered him more
dangerous but less culpable. Those jurors could also conclude, however,
that the special issue format allowed them to give effect to the aggravating
edge of the sword that addressed increased risk but not to the mitigating
edge that addressed decreased culpability.13 Thus, the critical defect in the
special issue format as applied to Penry was that his mental retardation
might have been a two-edged sword in substance but not in effect. Further, it was the relevant mitigating edge that the jury was not able to apply, bringing the case into conflict with precedent requiring that the sentencer be able to give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence. 4
Atkins addressed a statute with a sentencing structure that differed significantly from the special issue format addressed in Penry. The Virginia
statute at issue in Atkins limited capital punishment to cases in which the
jury found that the offender qualified as dangerous or the offense as vile.
The sentencing court also instructed the jury to consider all evidence presented in mitigation "that tended to make life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole a more appropriate punishment than death." 15 The
current Virginia statute explicitly identifies extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of the criminal
conduct, the age of the defendant, and sub-average intellectual functioning
of the defendant as mitigating factors. 16 Thus, mental retardation, other
forms of impairment, or youth might function as a substantive two-edged
sword under this provision, but in contrast to the statute addressed in
Penry, these instructions authorize the jury to give effect to the aggravating and mitigating edges.
The sentencing provision applied in Simmons resembles that applied in
Atkins rather than the provision applied in Penry insofar as the Missouri
capital sentencing provision directs the sentencer to sentence the offender
to life in prison, rather than capital punishment, if mitigating evidence
12.
Id. at 323-24.
13.
Id.at 322-26.
14.
Id.at 319-21 (discussing the risk that the jury was unable to give effect to the mitigating
aspect of the evidence). Aletha Claussen-Schulz, Marc W. Pearce, & Robert F. Schopp, Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and CapitalSentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 471, 475-76 (2004).
15.
Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 316 n.6 (Va. 2000).
16.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4B (2004).
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outweighs aggravating evidence.' 7 The Missouri sentencing provision also
lists extreme mental or emotional disturbance, extreme duress, substantially impaired capacities, and the age of the defendant at the time of the
crime as mitigating factors.' 8 Thus, if Missouri sentencers find that factors such as impairment or youth constitute two-edged swords that render
offenders less culpable but more dangerous, they are explicitly instructed
to give effect to the mitigating edges of these two-edged swords.
In summary, the Penry reasoning regarding the two-edged sword reflected precedent requiring that sentencers be authorized to consider and
give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence.' 9 Reasonable jurors might
consider mental retardation a substantive two-edged sword in that it might
increase risk of further violence but decrease culpability as compared to
other offenders who commit similar crimes. Those reasonable jurors
might have understood the special issue instructions presented in the Penry
case as allowing them to give effect to the aggravating edge of the sword
but as precluding them from giving effect to the mitigating edge. Thus,
the constitutional defect in Penry was not that proffered mitigating evidence regarding mental retardation could constitute a substantive twoedged sword but rather that reasonable jurors could have understood the
instructions as precluding them from giving effect to the mitigating edge.
In short, the instructions were defective in Penry because mental retardation was not an effective two-edged sword. The Atkins and Simmons
opinions misapplied the reasoning grounded in Penry because the instructions applied in these cases allow the sentencers to give effect to the relevant mitigating effects of mental retardation and youth. 20 Neither the
Penry, Atlfns, nor Simmons opinions provide any guidance regarding the
most defensible interpretation of evidence that can reasonably be understood as a substantive two-edged sword because it provides a basis for
mitigation regarding culpability and for aggravation regarding dangerous2
ness. 1

MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030.4(3) (2005 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part).
17.
18.
Id. at § 565.032.3.
19.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 322-28 (discussing the two-edged sword concern).
See supra note 7. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 558, 573 (2005). The United States
20.
Supreme Court opinion in Simmons provided no explicit discussion of the two-edged sword. Insofar
as some passages (558, 573) are interpreted as addressing the risk that the prosecutor's argument
directed the jury to consider Simmons' age as aggravating but not as mitigating, it is consistent with
the interpretation of Penry as addressing circumstances in which the substantive two-edged sword is
not an effective two-edged sword.
21.
This Article does not address the broad range of reasoning in Atkins and Simmons; the purpose of this Article is to examine the two-edged sword concern specifically as well as the related
concerns regarding the appropriate form and scope of expert testimony.
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III. TWO-EDGED SWORDS AND LEGITIMATE PENAL PURPOSES
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, constitutional punishment cannot consist of the gratuitous infliction of pain; it must serve some legitimate penal purpose.22 The Court has consistently endorsed retribution and
deterrence as such purposes.23 Some opinions also identify incapacitation
as a legitimate penal purpose. 24 It is not entirely clear whether "deterrence" is consistently used in the strict sense to refer to prevention through
fear of consequences or whether it is sometimes used in the broad sense as
roughly equivalent to prevention. For the purpose of this analysis, I use
"deterrence" in the strict sense and "incapacitation" as an alternative form
of prevention designed to prevent crime by isolating or disabling the offender.2 5 Some early opinions rejected retribution as a legitimate purpose,
but later cases emphasize it by requiring punishment as a reasoned moral
response in proportion to the severity of the offense and the culpability,
blameworthiness, or moral responsibility of the offender.2 6
The most defensible interpretation of this requirement that punishment
serves some legitimate penal purpose is not entirely clear. On its face, it
requires only that punishment serves at least one acceptable purpose, prohibiting only punishment that serves no legitimate purpose. According to
this interpretation, any punishment that served either retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation would satisfy this requirement. Some later opinions apparently require punishment in proportion to culpability or moral
blameworthiness.27 Taken on their face, these opinions apparently require
punishment according to retributive standards and leave no role for prevention as a criterion or factor in selecting the proper sentence for a particular offender, except possibly as a basis for choosing among alternative
punishments that fall within the range defined by culpability. That is,
because we lack a precise measure of retributive proportionality, some
indefinite range of severity might qualify as proportionate for any particular offense and offender. In these circumstances, deterrence or incapacitation might provide legitimate reasons to select from among the sentences
within this range.
22.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20
(2002); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-86 (1976) (plurality opinion).
23.
See, e.g., infra notes 28-29.
24.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 n.29 (plurality opinion).
25.
Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The Rationale, Standard, and Jurisprudential
Significance of the Competence to Face Execution Requirement, 51 LA. L. REv. 995, 1009-11
(1991).
26.
Opinions rejecting retribution include Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304-05, 342-45
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring; Marshall, J., concurring); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 236-41 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Opinions emphasizing retribution as punishment in proportion to culpability include Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) and California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).

27.

Penry, 492 U.S. at 319; Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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One alternative interpretation of these latter opinions would apply prevention as a justifying purpose for maintaining an institution of criminal
punishment and retribution as the justification for applying that institution
to any particular individual for a particular offense. According to this
formulation, deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution provide legitimate
social purposes that justify society in maintaining the general institution.
Individual culpability justifies society in pursuing those purposes by applying this institution to a particular offender for a particular offense.28 The
Supreme Court's opinions and the relevant statutes do not appear consistent with this interpretation, however, because they apply the preventive
function to individual sentencing. Recent Court opinions precluding the
application of capital punishment to specific classes of offenders explicitly
contend that such punishment can serve neither the retributive nor the deterrence purposes. 29 Similarly, some statutory provisions require assessment of dangerousness as a sentencing consideration for the application of
capital punishment to specific offenders. The special issue format, for
example, requires a finding of dangerousness as a necessary condition for
application of capital punishment to a specific offender. 30 Virginia's sentencing provision requires a finding of either vileness or risk to render an
offender eligible for capital punishment, apparently treating incapacitation
of a dangerous offender as sufficient to render the offender eligible for
capital punishment in the absence of a corresponding degree of culpability
represented by a finding of vileness. 3' Other state statutes include some
formulation of risk as an aggravating factor that can render an individual
offender eligible for capital punishment or provide aggravating weight for
the purpose of applying capital punishment.32 These provisions apparently
represent the judgments that capital homicides are not sufficient to justify
capital punishment in the absence of some additional factors but that these
homicides plus some unspecified degree of risk are sufficient. Thus, increased risk appears to provide a justification for more severe punishment
of specific offenders for specific offenses independent of increased culpability. As such it appears inconsistent with a theory that separates prevention as a justification for the institution from culpability as the basis for the
application of that institution to a particular offender.

28.

H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

3-13 (1968) (distinguishing general justi-

fying aims of punishment from principles of distribution of punishments to specific offenders).
29.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20
(2002).
30.
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(l)(b)(B), (2)(a). (2003); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. ART. 37071 § 2(g) (2004-05 Supp. Pamphlet) (Both statutes require specific findings regarding deliberateness
and dangerousness.).
31.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4.c (2004).
32.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(3)(b), (9)(h) (2004); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 §§ 701.11,
701.12(7) (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (e), (h) (xi) (2003).
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Alternately, the legitimate penal purpose requirement might be interpreted as requiring negative retribution in that culpability sets the maximum punishment, but sentencers may select a less severe sentence than the
maximum authorized by culpability if doing so would serve other legitimate sentencing considerations.33 Although this interpretation departs
from the specific language of cases that apparently require punishment in
proportion to culpability, blameworthiness, or moral responsibility, it
would be consistent with the ordinary function of the Eighth Amendment
in setting limits on state punishment, rather than as requiring a specific
punishment.34
The Court's doctrine and contemporary statutes do not appear consistent with negative retributivism, however, because they appear to address
culpability and dangerousness as alternative justifications. The Atkins
opinion precludes capital punishment of mentally retarded offenders on the
basis of an analysis that contends that constitutional punishment must serve
either deterrence or retribution and that purports to demonstrate that such
punishment can serve neither of these purposes.3 5 If negative retributivism
were at issue, the reasoning would be complete with the conclusion that
capital punishment of mentally retarded offenders would not serve the
retributive function because they are insufficiently culpable to merit capital
punishment, regardless of the deterrence function.
The Virginia sentencing provision addresses vileness and dangerousness as alternative bases that render an offender eligible for capital punishment.36 Similarly, some state statutes that require the finding of at least
one statutory aggravating condition to render an offender eligible for capital punishment include dangerousness as one of these factors.37 These
statutes do not treat conviction of a capital offense as sufficient to qualify
offenders for capital punishment, but they do accept the possibility that
these offenders can become eligible for capital punishment for those offenses with findings of dangerousness that do not require additional findings of increased culpability. Thus, they appear to rest on the premise that
justified capital punishment can rest upon an offense that is not in itself
sufficient to justify capital punishment and an additional finding of risk,
independent of any additional finding of culpability. Further, the Court's
decision in Ewing v. Californid8 appears to have recognized the legitimacy of repeat offender statutes that authorize extended sentences primar-

33.
THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 759 (2d ed. 1999).
34.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174-87 (1976) (plurality opinion); U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
35.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002). The Court applied a similar pattern of
reasoning to mentally retarded offenders. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
36.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
37.
See supra note 32 (citing relevant statutes).
38.
538 U.S. 11 (2003) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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ily on the basis of incapacitation. 39 The plurality opinion in that case apparently accepts the premise that culpability for the offense and risk of
be jusrepeated offenses can justify more severe incarceration than 4would
0
tified by the offender's culpability for the immediate offense.
In summary, the Supreme Court's doctrine requires that punishment
serve some legitimate penal purpose, and various opinions identify retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation as legitimate penal purposes. The
opinions do not provide a clear interpretation of the appropriate relationships among these functions. The two-edged sword concern raised in
Penry addressed a sentencing process in which the jurors arguably were
prevented from giving mitigating effect to the relevant mitigating evidence
regarding mental retardation. 41 If this is the only concern raised by evidence that a reasonable sentencer could interpret as supporting an inference of decreased culpability and increased risk, then the two-edged
sword concern is an illusion. That is, evidence that can serve as a twoedged sword raises no constitutional concern, providing that it is an effective two-edged sword in that the instructions allow the sentencer to give
effect to the relevant mitigating edge-although the sentencer might legitimately conclude that the aggravating edge cuts more deeply than the
mitigating edge. This interpretation appears to conflict with the cases requiring punishment in proportion to culpability, however, because those
cases apparently use culpability to define the appropriate punishment, or at
least to set a limit on severity of punishment. Yet, two-edged sword evidence that supports a judgment of decreased culpability and increased risk
appears to authorize punishment beyond that which would be proportionate
to culpability if that punishment is needed to ameliorate risk.
Can one articulate any interpretation of the two-edged sword concern
that coheres with a defensible interpretation of the legitimate penal purpose doctrine and with a conception of dangerousness appropriate to
criminal sentencing? Can this interpretation advance our ability to interpret the significance of evidence that supports an impression of decreased
culpability but increased risk? Can such an interpretation provide guidance regarding the most defensible scope and form of expert testimony
relevant to dangerousness for the purpose of capital sentencing?

39.
40.
41.

Id. at 14-20.
Id.
492 U.S. at 322-28.
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IV. DANGEROUSNESS AS A CAPITAL SENTENCING FACTOR

A. CapitalSentencing Statutes andExpert Testimony RegardingDangerousness
Capital sentencing statutes that explicitly identify risk as a sentencing
criterion or factor do not specify a threshold of probability or severity.
Rather, they address risk in terms suggesting some indeterminate degree
and severity such as "a probability," "a propensity,"
"a continuing
42
threat," "a substantial and continuing threat," or "likely to commit."
One might interpret these phrases to apply to any offender who represents
any probability, propensity, or threat. This interpretation Tenders the requirement vacuous, however, because it would be fulfilled by virtually any
convicted offender. Thus, it would neither narrow the range of eligible
offenders nor identify those most appropriate for capital punishment from
among those who were eligible.4 3
Alternately, particularly when phrased as "a probability," these provisions might be understood as requiring that further violence by the offender is more likely than not. 44 This interpretation is also problematic
because we lack the basis to make reasonably accurate estimates of probability for individual offenders and because it would apparently exempt an
offender who represented a 49% risk of further violence, regardless of
severity. Insofar as prevention of further violence through incapacitation
is a legitimate justification for capital punishment, it is not clear what
would justify placing a substantial but less than 50% risk of severe violence on the potential innocent victims, rather than on the culpable criminal who generates the risk. This interpretation would be particularly difficult to defend as applied to provisions that treat risk as a necessary condition for capital punishment because this approach would preclude capital
punishment of an offender who was extremely culpable and estimated to
present a slightly less than 50% risk while authorizing capital punishment
of an offender who was much less culpable but presented a slightly greater
than 50% risk.45
42.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(9)(b) ("a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.12(7) ("a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society"); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) (language identical to Oklahoma's); TEX. CRIM.PROC.
CODE. ANN. art. 37.071 Sec. 2(b)(1) (language identical to Oklahoma's and Oregon's); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-264.4.C (2004) ("a probability ... that he would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society"); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2003) ("poses a
substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of
criminal violence").
43.
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-73 (1994) (articulating the distinct narrowing and
selection functions).
44.
United States v. Sampson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 166, 223 (D. Mass. 2004).
45.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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In addition to raising justificatory concerns such as these, this interpretation raises empirical concerns about the ability of sentencers to make
such judgments and about the available basis for expert testimony relevant
to this standard. This interpretation of dangerousness as more likely than
not, or some similar interpretation, appears to be implicit in recent criticism of expert testimony regarding dangerousness for the purpose of capital sentencing. Recent commentary raises a series of concerns regarding
expert testimony that relies on certain indicators to offer opinions regarding the dangerousness of the offender for purposes of capital sentencing.
These concerns include the following.
First, some commentators criticize expert testimony that relies on the
Psychopathy Check List-Revised (PCL-R) to support the opinion that the
offender would be dangerous in the prison environment.46 They criticize
this testimony because the PCL-R has not been validated as a predictor of
violence in prison, as opposed to in the community. Thus, they contend
that the PCL-R does not provide a reliable indicator of violence for the
purpose of a capital sentencing decision that will result in either a capital
sentence or an extended prison sentence. 47 Some articles extend this general type of criticism to other available risk assessment instruments. 48 At
least one writer combines this criticism with the observation that many
studies of violence outside the prison environment by those who score
above a designated score on the PCL-R reveal a violence rate at or below
fifty percent. Thus, prediction of violence based on those scores should
be expected to produce a false positive rate of approximately fifty percent
apart from the concerns regarding different circumstances. 49 Second, they
criticize testimony that an offender would be violent or dangerous in
prison because they contend that studies of general violence rates in prison

46.
The PCL-R is a clinical instrument that is frequently used as part of an assessment of risk of
criminal behavior. For discussion, see ifia sources listed below in notes 47-49.
47.
Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Violence Risk Assessment at Federal Capital
Sentencing, 29 CRIM. JusT. & BEHAv. 512, 526-27, 531 (2002); Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J.
Reidy, Don't Confuse Me with the Facts, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 20, 30-31 (1999); John F. Edens
et al., Predictions of Future Dangerousness in CapitalMurder Trials: Is It Time to "Disinvent the
Wheel?", 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 65-68 (2005); John F. Edens, John Petrilla, & Jacqueline K.
Buffington-Vollum, Psychopathy and the Death Penalty: Can the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
Identify Offenders Who Represent "A Continuing Threat to Society"? 29 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433,
445-55 (2001); John F. Edens, Misuses of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Court. 16 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1082, 1086 (2001).
48.
See, e.g., Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger ofDangerousnessin CapitalSentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 L. & PSYCHOL.
REv. 63, 87-89 (2005); Edens et al. (2005), supra note 47, at 64-76.
49.
David Freedman, False Prediction of Future Dangerousness: Error Rates and Psychopathy
Checklist-Revised, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 91-94 (2001) (not validated in prison and
false positive rate generally above fifty percent).
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demonstrate that the base rates of prison violence are low, rendering such
predictions vulnerable to a high rate of false positives. 50
Third, some commentators criticize expert predictions of dangerousness in prison that are based on a history of violence in the community
because prison environments differ markedly from community environments, and a history of violence in the community has not been validated
as predictor of violence in the prison setting.-5 Fourth, they criticize expert testimony that an offender would be violent or dangerous in prison
because special high-security facilities provide environments that differ
substantively from community or ordinary prison environments, undermining the reliability of predictions of violence in these high security facilities on the basis of base rates or prior histories of violence in different
environments such as the community or ordinary prison units.52
Generally, these articles do not provide precise descriptions of the testimony they consider inappropriate with specific criticisms of the manner
in which that testimony was presented. Although they frequently refer to
predictions of violence or of dangerousness, they also phrase these criticisms in terms addressing expert opinions that the offender is dangerousness or presents a continuing threat. The general form of the critical discussion suggests that the authors object to any testimony in capital sentencing hearings that employs the indicators discussed to support a prediction
of violence or an opinion that the offender presents a continuing threat.
The combination of empirical concerns regarding the basis for expert testimony and the previously discussed justificatory concerns regarding the
defensible interpretation of dangerousness as a sentencing criterion or factor reveals the need for clarification of the applicable conception of dangerousness and for examination of its legitimate role in capital sentencing.
Consider first the following hypothetical capital defendants.
B. Hypothetical CapitalDefendants
A mail carrier disappears while delivering mail in a residential
neighborhood. Anderson shoots a police officer who comes to his house
searching for the missing mail carrier.
More police arrive and arrest
Anderson. They discover the body of the missing carrier in Anderson's
basement. Anderson suffers a psychotic disorder involving severe delusions that all people in uniforms are agents of Satan who have been sent to
50.
Cunningham & Reidy (1999), supra note 47, at 23-25; Dorland & Krauss, supra note 48, at
88-89, 92 n.190, 96; Edens et al. (2005), supra note 47, at 58-62; Edens et al. (2001), supra note 47,
at 452-53.
51.
Cunningham & Reidy (2002), supra note 47, at 525, 528; Dorland & Krauss, supra note 48,
at 92-102 (conviction for murder does not provide a reliable indicator of violence in prison); Edens et
al. (2005), supra note 47, at 60, 79.
52.
Cunningham & Reidy (2002), supra note 47, at 529; Cunningham & Reidy (1999), supra note
47, at 32-33; Edens et al. (2001), supra note 47, at 453-54; Edens, supranote 47, at 1086.
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earth to enslave humanity and to kill Anderson because only he has the
divine powers needed to defeat Satan. He is found not guilty by reason of
insanity (NGRI) for the homicides of the mail carrier and the police officer
and committed to a secure facility for treatment. Unfortunately, he is not
susceptible to treatment expected to render him less delusional or less dangerous because he also suffers neuroleptic malignant syndrome (NMS)
which precludes treatment with antipsychotic drugs. 53 He remains severely psychotic and extremely aggressive, frequently attacking and seriously injuring staff. Due to NMS, there is no prospect of significantly
ameliorating his condition. The only choices are isolation and restraint or
ongoing violence. Constant isolation and restraint prevent violence against
other residents of the facility, but it does not eliminate serious violence
toward staff who must approach him to provide food and health care.
Should Anderson receive capital punishment? He is not eligible for
capital punishment or for any alternative form of punishment because he
has been acquitted by reason of insanity and therefore exempted from any
form of punishment. If culpability and dangerousness are alternative
grounds for punishment pursuant to alternative legitimate penal purposes
of retribution or prevention, however, why would capital punishment not
be appropriate for Anderson who poses a severe ongoing threat in a secure
facility? Perhaps one might respond that a threshold level of culpability is
necessary to render an individual eligible for any criminal punishment but
that culpability and dangerousness then provide alternative grounds for an
enhanced severity of punishment.
Consider Brown, who is convicted of murder and receives a sentence
of life in prison. The sentencer concludes that he is not eligible for capital
punishment because no statutory aggravating factors apply in a jurisdiction
that requires a determination that at least one statutory aggravating factor
applies to render an offender eligible for capital punishment. 54 Approximately eight years later, he deteriorates into a condition similar to Anderson in which he manifests severe psychosis with persecutory delusions and
episodes of violent 'self-defense.' Like Anderson, he suffers NMS which
prevents active treatment to ameliorate psychosis, and he presents an ongoing severe risk to staff. Should Brown receive capital punishment?
Unlike Anderson, he was convicted of the original capital crime and thus
meets the threshold level of culpability necessary to render one eligible for
criminal punishment. Furthermore, the conclusion that no statutory aggravating factors applied was apparently erroneous because the sentencing
53.

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERs 795-98 (4th ed. Text Revision 2000) (briefly discussing neuroleptic malignant syndrome
as a pattern of severe pathological and sometimes fatal symptoms that occur in some individuals in
response to neuroleptic medication and that preclude the use of this medication by these individuals).
54.
See supra note 32 (statutes including dangerousness among the statutory aggravating factors
that can render an offender eligible for capital punishment).
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statute listed dangerousness as an aggravating factor but the risk he presented was not accurately estimated due to his unanticipated deterioration
and NMS. Set aside the double jeopardy issue, and ask whether capital
punishment would now be justified by the recognition that the risk he presents due to severe deterioration was unanticipated at sentencing. 55 If culpability and dangerousness provide alternative grounds that render an individual eligible for more severe punishment, should the elevated risk presented by Brown justify capital punishment for Brown, although he was
not sufficiently culpable to receive capital punishment for the original offense, and he is not responsible for the risk or injuries he currently inflicts
on others?
Compare Brown with Cook, whose condition is identical to Brown's
with one exception. Due to recent developments in diagnostic technology,
it is predictable with a high degree of confidence at the time of sentencing
that Cook will deteriorate to a severely psychotic and assaultive condition
in the future and that he will not be susceptible to treatment at that time
due to NMS. If reasonable sentencers would not consider Cook appropriate for capital punishment without that information because no statutory
aggravating factors applied, should the additional reliable evidence that he
will deteriorate in this manner render him appropriate for capital punishment for his initial offense? This condition was not active at the time of
his crime. Thus, it does not influence his culpability for the offense, and
by ordinary standards of culpability, he was guilty of the crime in circumstances that provided no statutory aggravating circumstances that would
render him eligible for capital punishment. Should the awareness that he
would reliably be expected to deteriorate to a condition that would render
him dangerous but not responsible in the future provide a sufficient reason
to justify a sentence of capital punishment in order to prevent the risk he
would present in the future? If culpability and dangerousness are two independent legitimate bases for selecting the more severe punishment, why
would reliable information of future dangerousness due to severe deterioration of psychological capacities not provide a legitimate basis for capital
punishment?
Compare these offenders with Davis, who has been convicted of multiple offenses including a recent murder committed in prison while serving
a life sentence as a repeat offender with a history of violent felonies. He
demonstrates no remorse or regret and threatens to kill others if given the
opportunity. Davis suffers no impairment of his capacities for comprehension or reasoning. He is callous, manipulative, and remorseless. He
engages in instrumental violence in order to force others to fulfill his
wishes and to avoid consequences for his crimes.
55.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb").
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In contrast to Anderson, Davis was fully culpable for the murder for
which he is to be sentenced. Thus, the question of capital sentencing
arises for Davis, but it does not for Anderson. Brown is similar to Davis
insofar as both were convicted of capital crimes, but they differ in that
Brown was considered insufficiently culpable to deserve capital punishment for the homicide for which he was convicted, while Davis was considered sufficiently culpable to deserve capital punishment for the homicide for which he was convicted. Thus, Brown differs from Davis in at
least two ways. First, his level of culpability for the predicate offenses
was evaluated as insufficient for capital punishment at the time of sentencing, and second, the determination that he presented an ongoing threat
occurred after sentencing when his condition deteriorated. Cook resembles Brown and differs from Davis insofar as his level of culpability for
the instant offense was evaluated as insufficient to justify capital punishment, but he differs from Brown and resembles Davis in that the future
risk he presents is identifiable at the time of sentencing. Thus, insofar as
the critical difference between Brown and Davis involves the ability to
identify the risk prior to sentencing, Cook resembles Davis rather than
Brown. Cook and Davis differ in that Davis but not Cook was evaluated
as highly culpable at the time of sentencing, but they resemble each other
insofar as both present a threat of further violence in prison. The risk
presented by each differs, however, in that Davis is reasonably expected to
engage in further violence for which he will be fully culpable, but Cook is
reasonably expected to engage in violence after experiencing deterioration
that will undermine his culpability.
Insofar as dangerousness is understood as an aggravating factor for
sentencing independent of culpability, the risk presented by Cook and
Davis provides equally good reason to apply capital punishment to each,
and both might reasonably be understood as appropriate candidates for
capital punishment. If it seems, however, that Cook's risk of future violence does not provide justification for a capital sentence comparable to
that provided by Davis's risk, this suggests that the aggravating significance of the ongoing risk of future violence should not be understood as
independent of culpability. That is, Davis presents a risk of further violence in circumstances that suggest that he would be fully culpable for that
violence, but Cook presents a risk of future violence in circumstances that
suggest that he would not be culpable for that violence. If this difference
seems significant for capital sentencing, we need further inquiry into the
defensible relationship between culpability and dangerousness for the purpose of capital sentencing.
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V. A LEGAL CONCEPTION OF DANGEROUSNESS
A. Expert Testimony RegardingDangerousness
Expert testimony that is relevant to some matter at issue and presented
by an expert who is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education is admissible unless the risk of prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs the probative value .56 In a capital sentencing hearing, testimony regarding dangerousness can be relevant because constitutional capital punishment must serve some legitimate penal purpose, and prevention
through incapacitation represents one such legitimate penal purpose to
which a determination of dangerousness is directly relevant." Thus, expert testimony regarding dangerousness for the purpose of capital sentencing should take a form that renders it relevant to incapacitation as a legitimate consideration in selecting the degree and type of punishment. In
ordinary usage, a person or activity is dangerous if it generates peril or
risk of harm. The same basic notion of peril or risk applies in legal contexts. 58 If dangerousness required only that one present a risk of harm,
virtually everyone would qualify as dangerous. Risk can vary in probability and in severity. Those who present an elevated probability of
harm, a risk of harm of a more severe type, or some combination of the
two might qualify as dangerous for the purpose of justifying a specified
legal intervention or liability. Thus, decisionmakers need some guidance
regarding the properties of risk that qualify the risk presented by a particular individual or activity as dangerousness for a specified legal purpose.
B. A Legal Conception of Dangerousnessfor Civil Commitment
The applicable conception of dangerousness has received relatively
careful attention in the area of civil commitment. Although dangerousness
is often discussed in terms of prediction, a determination of dangerousness
for a specific legal purpose, such as civil commitment, is not a prediction
of dangerousness or of harmful behavior. I have discussed the distinction
between predictions of harm and determinations of dangerousness elsewhere. 60 Consider a brief illustration of the distinction between a judgment of dangerousness and a prediction of harm. A ten-year-old child
comes home and tells her parents that she has heard about an exciting new
game she wants to try just once. That game is Russian roulette. The par56.
57.

FED. R. EViD. 401, 402 (relevance), 403 (prejudice), 702 (expert testimony).
See supra Part III.

58.

ROBERT F. SCHOPP, COMPETENCE, CONDEMNATION, AND COMMITMENT 216 (2001).

59.
Id. at 216-20.
60.
Id. at 213-18; Robert F. Schopp, OutpatientCivil Commitment: A Dangerous Chamde or a
Component of a Comprehensive Institution of Civil Comitmnent?, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 33,
48-56 (2003).
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ents respond, "No! That's dangerous!" The child responds, "But daddy,
you can't say that Russian roulette is dangerous; five of every six of your
predictions would be false positives. 6 1 The child is correct in her assertion that a prediction of harm would result in a false positive in five out of
every six incidents. The parents are also correct, however, in their contention that Russian roulette is dangerous. Both parties are correct precisely because a determination of dangerousness is not a prediction of
harm. When the parents reject Russian roulette as dangerous, they do not
predict that any particular incident of the game will cause harm. Rather,
they recognize that a single incident creates one chance in six of severe
harm and five chances in six of no harm. By prohibiting the game as dangerous, they express the judgment that this level of risk for no purpose of
comparable value is sufficient to justify prohibiting the activity.
According to ordinary language and civil commitment statutes, dangerousness is a current property of a person in the circumstances relevant
to the decision to be made. 62 A person is dangerous for a particular purpose, including legal purposes, when that person presents risk sufficient in
probability and severity for the purpose for which the determination is
made. Although civil commitment statutes ordinarily identify dangerousness or some similar condition as a criterion of commitment, they ordinarily provide only broad general guidance regarding the degree or severity
of risk that qualifies as dangerousness for that purpose. Some statutes
provide some guidance regarding the type of risk that qualifies in that they
frame the criterion as addressing risk of bodily harm, serious bodily harm,
physical injury, or some alternative formulation.6 3 Although they do not
specify the probability or severity of risk, that risk must be sufficient to
justify a severe intrusion into individual liberty. 64
Strong evidence of serious risk might fulfill the dangerousness criterion for civil commitment, but risk as such does not provide a sufficient
basis for commitment. Commitment also requires mental illness because
dangerousness cannot render an individual appropriate for commitment to
a mental health facility unless that dangerousness is appropriately related
to the intrusion into liberty at issue. That is, the elevated risk must be
appropriately related to the purpose and justification of the legal institution
in order to qualify an individual for intervention through that institution.
Thus, dangerousness for the purpose of commitment to a mental health
facility must be appropriately related to mental illness.65
Commitment criteria of mental illness and dangerousness might be understood as simply requiring that both criteria are met or as requiring that
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See supra text accompanying notes 42-425.
See SCHOPP, supra note 58, at 216-17; Schopp, supra note 60, at 49-52.
BRUCE J. WINCK, CIVIL COMMITMENT 81-86 (2005).
SCHOPP, supra note 58, at 219-20.
Id. at 223-28.
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the individual be dangerous due to mental illness. Some commitment statutes explicitly require the causal connection, but others require only that
the individual meets both criteria. 66 Courts, lawyers, and experts may or
may not recognize the difference between these two types of statutes in
any particular case. Insofar as they do, the distinction might have no impact on outcome in many circumstances, but it can affect the outcome of
the commitment hearing and the role of the expert under certain circumstances. Consider, for example, the cases of X, Y, and Z.
X has engaged in a series of assaults on others that support the determination that he is dangerous in the broad, ordinary sense of that term, but
that dangerousness does not qualify him for civil commitment under either
type of statute because X manifests no evidence of psychological impairment, and civil commitment ordinarily requires mental illness or some
similar formulation of a criterion involving impairment. 67 Thus, X's assaults justify criminal sentences but not civil commitment. At some future
parole hearing, these assaults may serve as evidence of dangerousness for
the purpose of refusing parole.
Y has engaged in a series of assaults on others, and these have been
associated with a chronic schizophrenic disorder involving persecutory
delusions. When his disorder exacerbates, he assaults others in delusional
"self-defense."
Y currently manifests an exacerbation of persecutory
delusions and of the accompanying fear of others in ordinarily innocuous
interactions. Y is dangerous in the ordinary sense of the term, and he
qualifies for commitment, regardless of whether the applicable criteria
require mental illness and dangerousness or dangerousness due to mental
illness.
Z has engaged in a life-long pattern of criminal behavior, including a
series of assaults on others. He has been convicted and jailed for some of
these assaults. He is dangerous in the broad ordinary sense because he
had demonstrated his willingness to assault others who anger or frustrate
him, revealing his lack of empathy or concern for others. Recently, he
has developed serious impairment of reality testing, judgment, and reasoning as a result of his long-term pattern of alcohol and drug abuse. He
continues to assault others who fail to comply with his wishes, and he continues to lack empathy and concern for others. There is no evidence,
however, to suggest that these assaults are the product of his deteriorating
psychological functioning. Rather, these assaults reveal the same pattern
of callous, instrumental aggression that characterized his earlier offenses.
Thus, he remains dangerous, and he is mentally ill in the form of signifi66.
For examples of statutes that explicitly require the causal connection, see TENN. CODE ANN.
33-6-401, 403; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a) (Vernon 2003). For an example that explicitly requires only the conjunction of mental illness and dangerousness, see Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 51.20 (1) (West 2004 Cummulative Annual Pocket Part).
67.
WIMNCK, supra note 63, at 75-81.
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cant impairment of his cognitive capacities, but there is no apparent reason
to think that his dangerousness is a product of his mental illness. Z's impairment fulfills the mental illness criterion for civil commitment, and his
pattern of conduct fulfills the dangerousness criterion. His impairment
and pattern of conduct together fulfill the combined commitment criteria
under a statute requiring mental illness and dangerousness, but this combination of mental illness and dangerousness does not fulfill the commitment
criteria for a statute requiring dangerousness due to mental illness. In any
particular case, the legal actors and clinicians may or may not recognize
this distinction, but insofar as the criteria are applied as written, this distinction is important in cases such as those presented by Z.
A determination that X, Y, or Z is or is not dangerous in a manner
that fulfills the criteria for civil commitment requires an estimate of the
risk that individual presents and a determination that this risk is sufficient
in magnitude and associated with mental illness in the manner required by
the applicable statute. Expert testimony might provide information regarding the degree and severity of the risk and explanation regarding the manner in which each individual generates this risk. The court must determine
that the risk is sufficient for the purpose of commitment and that it stands
in the relationship to the mental illness required by the statute. In order
to ascertain whether a commitment statute should be written to require
mental illness and dangerousness or dangerousness due to mental illness,
one needs an analysis of the purpose and justification of commitment. I
do not purport to provide that analysis here.68 The central point for the
current project is that the determination that a person qualifies as dangerous for the purpose of commitment requires an assessment of the probability and severity of the risk and an assessment of the relationship between
the risk and mental illness as required by the relevant commitment criteria.
Those criteria should articulate a conception of dangerousness appropriate
to the purpose of and justification for civil commitment. Well-formulated
criteria of dangerousness or risk for other legal purposes would also be
appropriately related to the purposes and justifications of the institutions
involved. Statutes and court decisions vary markedly in the degree to
which they fulfill this function. Several areas of law address this function,
although terminology varies.
C. Negligence Liability
Negligence liability in tort depends partially on risk. Negligence liability requires "conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of
causing damage" or fails to protect others from "unreasonable risk of

68.

See SCHOPP, supra note 58, at 81-108, 137-57.
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harm." 69 When dangerousness is understood as risk sufficient for a particular purpose, risk that qualifies as unreasonable constitutes dangerousness for the purpose of negligence liability. The risk necessary to qualify
as unreasonable risk for the purpose of establishing liability in negligence
depends partially on the probability and gravity of the harm risked. The
evaluation of risk is not limited to probability and gravity, however, because these parameters must be evaluated in light of the social value of the
type of conduct in question. 70 To avoid negligence liability, an individual
must exercise the care and prudence of the reasonable person in the circumstances. The reasonable person standard is not an empirical estimate
of care that the average person would exercise. Rather, it represents a
community ideal of a reasonable person as one who exercises the care and
prudence appropriate to the risk of harm created by the activity in question and the social value of that activity. 7' Thus, the judgment that behavior creates risk sufficient to ground negligence liability reflects the judgment that the behavior violates social standards of reasonableness and prudence because it creates risk disproportionate to its social value. Risk that
is disproportionate in this sense qualifies as unreasonable risk for the purpose of negligence liability. Thus, it constitutes dangerousness in the
sense of risk sufficient to justify legal liability for negligence.
Consider, for example, a private individual, A, who drives along city
streets at a speed that exceeds the legal speed limit by ten miles per hour
in order to arrive at a theater before the movie is scheduled to begin. Because he is driving ten miles above the speed limit, A is unable to stop
when a traffic light turns yellow and then red. A proceeds into the intersection and causes a collision with another car entering the intersection
from another direction with a green light. Shattered glass caused by the
accident severs the artery of a child in the other car. A third driver, B,
witnesses the accident sees the child bleeding profusely, places the child in
his undamaged car, and drives toward the hospital at speeds exceeding the
legal limits by 30 miles per hour. As B speeds along the city streets, another vehicle swerves to avoid B's car and hits a pole, damaging the vehicle.
A court might appropriately find that A was negligent in causing the
unreasonable risk by driving ten miles per hour above the speed limit but
that B was not negligent in exceeding the legal limit by thirty miles per
hour. In so finding, the court would appropriately find that B generated a
higher degree of risk than that generated by A but that B, in contrast to A,
did not create unreasonable risk because he acted in the interest of a
greater social value. Thus, B's conduct and the risk created by that conduct was reasonable in the circumstances, but A's conduct and the risk
69.

PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 169 (5th ed. 1984).

70.
71.

Id.at 171.
Id.at 174-75.
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created by that conduct was unreasonable in the circumstances. When
dangerousness is understood as risk sufficient to justify a particular type of
legal liability or intervention, A's conduct was dangerous for the purpose
of imposing negligence liability while B's was not, although B's conduct
generated greater risk than A's conduct generated. This conclusion reflects the judgments that B's conduct was in pursuit of social interests that
justified the risk created and that A's conduct was in pursuit of interests
that did not justify the risk created. Thus, the determination that speeding
did or did not create risk sufficient to qualify as dangerous for the purpose
of establishing negligence liability requires estimates of the probability and
severity of the risk and justificatory evaluation of the social value of the
activity at issue.
D. Reckless Endangerment
Criminal liability for reckless endangerment attaches to an offender
who "recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another in
danger of death or serious bodily injury. 72 Consider two individuals who
place others in danger of death or serious bodily injury. C is a police officer who arrives on the scene of a bank robbery in progress. C fires his
gun at the robber D in the crowded bank in order to prevent D from killing a teller who has not produced money sufficient to satisfy D's demand.
E is a hunter sighting in his rifle in a field in preparation for hunting season. As a freight train passes the edge of the field, E decides to get some
practice with a moving target. E fires his rifle at the lettering on the side
of a box car as the train passes the field. E misses the train and his bullet
falls harmlessly in the field.
Witnesses observe both events. E is charged with reckless endangerment and convicted of that offense, but C is not charged with any offense.
Both created risk of serious bodily harm to others, and C created much
more severe risk because he fired at chest level in a bank crowded with
customers and employees, while E fired at a box car passing an open field.
Recklessness requires conscious disregard of substantial and unjustifiable
risk, however, and C's conduct, including the risk generated by that conduct, was justified by the socially valuable function of preventing the murder of the teller.73 E's conduct, in contrast, created much less risk in that
the probability of harming an innocent individual was quite low, but it
served no socially valuable purpose. In order to qualify as reckless endangerment, the conduct must create risk that is substantial in quantity and
severity, and the actor must generate that risk in circumstances that render
it unjustifiable by social standards. Although E created risk of relatively
72.
73.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (reckless endangerment).
Id. at § 2.02(2)(c) (recklessness).
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low probability, the potential severity and the lack of social justification
renders the risk substantial and unjustified. Thus, C consciously created
risk of comparable severity and of much greater probability than the risk
created by E, but E's conduct constituted reckless endangerment for the
purpose of establishing criminal liability while C's did not because C created a justified risk while E created an unjustified risk. Determining dangerousness for this purpose requires an evaluation of the probability and
severity of risk and a qualitative evaluation of the social justification for
the conduct creating the risk.
E. A Legal Conception ofDangerousness
The examples of civil commitment, civil negligence, and reckless endangerment reveal a common pattern. A determination that a person or
action qualifies as dangerous in a manner that renders that person or action
appropriate for a particular type of legal intervention or liability requires
an empirical assessment of the risk, including the probability, severity,
and circumstances of harm, and a justificatory judgment that this risk is
sufficient to justify a specified legal intervention or a specific type of legal
liability. The empirical assessment of the risk includes an estimate of the
probability and severity of the risk generated by the person in the circumstances. When relevant information is available, it could also explain the
manner in which the individual generates the risk and potential risk management strategies. 74
The justificatory judgment that the risk is sufficient to constitute dangerousness for a particular legal purpose includes quantitative and qualitative components. Many types of human conduct involve some risk of
harm. To qualify as dangerous for a specified legal purpose, a person or
activity must generate risk sufficient in magnitude to justify the intervention or liability at issue, where magnitude includes both probability and
severity. For the purpose of civil commitment, the risk must be sufficient
to justify the massive intrusion into individual liberty.7 5 For negligence
liability, the risk must exceed that which a reasonable person would create
in the circumstances, where a reasonable person is understood as one who
exercises the care appropriate to the social value of the conduct in question
and of the risk generated. 76 For criminal liability for reckless endangerment, the risk must be substantial and unjustified; that is, it must be more
than the circumstances justify according to social standards embodied in
law.77
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In addition to generating risk that is sufficient in quantity for a particular legal purpose, the person or activity must generate that risk in a manner that justifies the type of legal intervention or liability at issue. That is,
the risk must provide an appropriate basis for application of the specific
legal intervention or liability. Civil commitment predicated upon dangerousness, for example, requires some association with mental illness. It
may require mental illness and dangerousness, or it may require dangerousness due to mental illness.78 The former type of provision requires only
that the individual creating the risk suffer the appropriate type of mental
illness, but the latter formulation requires that the appropriate type of mental illness produces the risk. The dispute regarding the more appropriate
formulation depends partially upon the justification of civil commitment.
In either case, the risk must be associated with mental illness in order to
render the state intervention in the form of commitment reasonably related
to the state purpose that justifies the intervention, but the type of association required varies with the formulation and the justification represented
by that formulation.79
Risk for the purpose of civil negligence liability must be associated
with activity that lacks sufficient social value to justify the risk because
negligence liability is intended partially to channel behavior away from
conduct that creates risk absent commensurate social value.80 Similarly, in
order to justify criminal conviction and punishment, the type and circumstances of risk must be consistent with the social functions of criminal
punishment. An individual who created a serious risk of death or bodily
harm but was unaware of that risk due to lack of careful attention, for
example, would have engaged in conduct that could qualify as dangerous
for the purpose of civil negligence liability but not for the purpose of
criminal liability for reckless endangerment because criminal recklessness
requires conscious disregard but civil negligence liability does not." This
would be the case despite the risk qualifying as sufficient in quantity for
both forms of liability. Risk absent conscious disregard satisfies the requirements for civil negligence liability but not for criminal liability as
reckless endangerment because the latter but not the former requires culpability justifying the condemnation inherent in criminal punishment. 2
In short, a determination that a person or action qualifies as dangerous
in a manner that renders that person or action appropriate to a particular
form of legal intervention or liability requires 1) an empirical assessment
of the probability and severity of risk in the relevant circumstances, including any available explanation of the manner in which that person gen78.
79.

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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erates the risk and any available information regarding risk management
strategies likely to ameliorate that risk; 2) a justificatory judgment that this
risk is quantitatively sufficient in probability and severity to justify the
legal intervention or liability at issue; and 3) a justificatory judgment that
the person or activity generates this risk in a manner that is qualitatively
sufficient to justify the type of legal intervention or liability at issue.
VI. DANGEROUSNESS AS A JUSTIFYING CONDITION FOR CAPITAL
- PUNISHMENT

A. Eligibilityfor Condemnation:Anderson and Davis
Anderson's dangerousness provides no basis for any punishment because he lacks culpability for killing the mail carrier. Anderson, the insanity defense, and the broader requirements of culpability contained in
the voluntary act requirement and culpability elements reflect the function
of the criminal law as an institution of coercive behavior control that is
specifically appropriate to those who possess the capacities for responsible
agency. 83 Theorists might advance different formulations of the appropriate requirements of responsible agency, but in general terms, criminal
responsibility requires the abilities to comprehend the prohibitions contained in criminal offense definitions and the circumstances relevant to
those prohibitions, as well as the ability to direct one's behavior relevant
to those prohibitions and circumstances through a minimally adequate
process of practical reasoning .84 Those who possess these minimal capacities have the ability to function as responsible agents in the public jurisdiction of a society governed by an institution of criminal law. They exercise
the liberty to direct their own conduct through the application of these
capacities within the bounds defined by the criminal law. If they transgress those boundaries, they are subject to coercive behavior control
through the institution of criminal punishment that is uniquely appropriate
to those who possess these capacities. Those who lack these minimal capacities are subject to alternative institutions of coercive behavior control,
such as civil commitment, designed for those who lack the capacities of
responsible agency.8 5
Criminal punishment through incarceration and post-acquittal commitment of offenders such as Anderson share some common purposes including crime prevention through incapacitation. In certain cases, specific
individuals may find either form of confinement more averse than the
other, and other individuals might not subjectively experience any signifi83.
defense)
84.
85.
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cant differences between these two forms of incapacitation. From the societal perspective, however, criminal punishment differs from alternative
forms of coercive behavior control in that punishment carries an inherent
expression of condemnation, including reprobation and resentment, of the
offender as a responsible agent who culpably committed a criminal offense. 86 Insofar as criminal punishment expresses condemnation of the
criminal conduct and of the culpable offender for engaging in that conduct,
justified punishment must fit the crime in the sense that it must express
condemnation appropriate to the wrongfulness of the offense and the culpability of the offender.87 As discussed previously, the most defensible
interpretation of the Supreme Court opinions that require punishment in
proportion to culpability, blameworthiness, or moral responsibility is not
entirely clear.88 Insofar as these opinions are reasonably interpreted as
limiting the severity of punishment to that which is proportionate to culpability, however, they are consistent with this expressive function of punishment that limits the expression of reprobation and resentment to that
which is justified by the offender's culpable wrongdoing.
Anderson is not eligible for criminal punishment for his offenses because he lacks the capacities that would render him an appropriate subject
of condemnation. Further, the risk of further violence he presents is associated with the impairment that renders him not criminally responsible for
his prior criminal conduct and undermines his standing as a responsible
agent regarding his future behavior. Thus, criminal punishment does not
provide an appropriate intervention for the amelioration of that risk. Societal safety might require extended confinement and physical restraint.
Anderson might not recognize or care about the distinction between police
power commitment and criminal punishment. Anderson might even prefer
imprisonment or execution to permanent commitment and restraint. 89 Societal integrity and self-discipline require, however, that the criminal justice system restrict punishment to those who culpably commit crimes that
justify the expression of condemnation inherent in criminal punishment.
Only by restricting the application of criminal punishment in this manner
can society discharge the responsibility to exercise coercive behavior control through institutions that respect the standing of responsible agents. 90
Davis, in contrast, is fully culpable for his criminal offenses because
he suffers no impairment of the capacities of comprehension and practical
reasoning that enable him to function as a responsible agent in the public
domain. The estimate that he presents a severe risk of future criminal
86.
FEINBERG, supra note 82, at 98-101; ScHoPP, supranote 58, at 145-46.
87.
FEINBERG, supra note 82, at 118.
88.
See supra Part HI.
89.
Some convicted offenders choose to "volunteer" for execution, rather than pursuing appeals.
See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
90.
SCHOPP, supra note 58, at 146-48.
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conduct is based on his past pattern of culpable criminal behavior, his
threats, and his demonstrated inclination to engage in conduct manifesting
personality traits such as viciousness, cold bloodedness, and lack of remorse or empathy that we infer from a variety of sources, including his
prior criminal behavior. Davis and Anderson are similar insofar as the
judgments that each represents elevated risk of future harm reflect inferences drawn from their past criminal behavior and current personality
traits, some of which are inferred from that past criminal behavior. They
differ in that Anderson's past criminal behavior and personality traits undermine an ascription of criminal responsibility for that past criminal behavior and for the expected future crimes, but Davis's do not. Thus, neither Anderson's past criminal behavior nor his anticipated future behavior
provides a basis for the condemnation inherent in criminal punishment. 9'
B. Dangerousnessand Culpabilityas Aggravating Factors
Several state capital sentencing statutes discussed previously include
dangerousness as a necessary or sufficient condition to render an offender
eligible for capital punishment.92 Under these provisions, offenders who
are found guilty of capital murder must fulfill some additional condition or
conditions to become eligible for capital punishment, and some formulation of dangerousness can fulfill this function. Dangerousness is sufficient
to render a capital offender eligible for capital punishment in all of these
states except Oregon, in which it is one of two jointly sufficient conditions. 9 3 In all of these states, mitigating factors can override the aggravating factors, resulting in a sentence less than capital punishment. 94 At first
glance, it appears that dangerousness provides an independent basis for
increasing the severity of punishment and that dangerousness and mitigating factors are distinct matters to be decided separately and then weighed
or balanced against each other in determining the sentence. Consider,
however, the requirements of qualitative sufficiency as applied to dangerousness as a criminal sentencing factor.

91.
The precise relationship between psychopathy and criminal responsibility remains a matter of
contention. Some writers contend that psychopathy undermines criminal responsibility, but others
deny this. Compare, e.g., Cordelia Fine & Jeanette Kennett, Mental Impairment,Moral Understanding, and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Pumishment, 27 INT'L J.L. &
PsYcmATRY 425 (2004) with Robert F. Schopp & Andrew J. Slain, Psychopathy, Criminal Responsibility, and Civil Commitment as a Sexual Predator, 18 BEHAV. So. & L. 247 (2000). This ongoing
debate reflects the more general point that the relevance of traits to the degree of punishment depends
upon the underlying theory of criminal responsibility and the application of that theory to a particular
offender or class of offenders.

92.

See supra Part III.

93.
See supra Part Im; OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(A), (B), (2)(a). (2003) (requiring findings
of deliberateness and dangerousness).
See statutes cited supra notes 30-32.
94.
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C. Dangerousness,Culpability, and Sentencing

Recall that although Anderson presents ongoing danger to others, that
danger is not weighed against mitigating factors. Rather, his impairment
precludes any consideration of criminal sentencing because it is sufficiently severe to justify an insanity acquittal. Although the severity of the
crime or the risk of future criminal behavior might influence some jurors'
evaluation of the offender's impairment as sufficient for an insanity acquittal, insanity provisions are written to articulate a threshold criterion that
identifies those who are not responsible for their criminal behavior, regardless of the ongoing threat they might represent.95 Such standards are
written to draw a dichotomous distinction between those who fulfill the
minimal requirements of criminal responsibility and those who do not.
The capacities of responsible agency, such as comprehension and reasoning, can vary along a continuum, however, with some of those who meet
the threshold requirement for criminal responsibility manifesting various
degrees of impairment relative to the ordinary or fully responsible level.96
Some capital sentencing provisions recognize this variability by listing as
mitigating factors impairment that reduces the offender's culpability but
does not meet the threshold for acquittal under an insanity defense. These
mitigating factors can address conditions such as psychological impairment, distress, or age that reduce the offenders' culpability for their offenses but are not sufficient to exculpate. 97 These mitigating factors provide good reasons to subject the offenders to less severe punishment, representing less severe condemnation, than would be appropriate to offenders who committed similar offenses in the absence of comparable mitigation.
Insanity and capital sentencing provisions of the type discussed here
apparently contemplate a two stage analysis of the relationship between
culpability and dangerousness. First, offenders must meet some threshold
level of culpability in order to qualify as criminally responsible. Offenders such as Anderson, who manifest impairment sufficient to render them
not responsible under the applicable insanity standard, are not eligible for
criminal punishment regardless of the severity of risk they present. Capital offenders who meet this threshold are then subject to a second stage in
which circumstances relevant to culpability or risk are assessed independently and weighed as aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 98 If this is
the justified approach, however, it seems that Cook should be eligible for
capital punishment. Recall that Cook committed a capital offense in circumstances in which he did not fulfill any aggravating circumstance in95.
96.
97.
98.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (insanity standard).
SCHOPP, supranote 58, at 41-49.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(b), (f), (g), (h) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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volving culpability for that offense. If the sentencing statute lists dangerousness as an aggravating factor and the hypothesized technical advances
in diagnosis and prognosis occur, however, it seems that Cook would become eligible for capital punishment because the dangerousness aggravating factor would apply, and the severity of the risk would provide good
reason to apply capital punishment. Thus, his reliably expected deterioration into a condition that would render him no longer culpable for his conduct would justify a more severe sentence for the current offense.
A comparison of Anderson and Cook raises the following question. If
Anderson's dangerousness does not provide good reason to apply capital
punishment for his crime, why would Cook's dangerousness justify eligibility for capital punishment when he was not sufficiently culpable to qualify absent the dangerousness, and he would not be expected to be responsible for the anticipated future harmful conduct? Why does dangerousness
unrelated to culpability provide good reason to apply more severe punishment and condemnation to Cook but not to Anderson? It might seem reasonable to respond that Cook differs from Anderson in that he is culpable
for his crime and thus eligible for punishment in proportion to any legitimate sentencing factor. If, however, more severe punishment expresses
more severe condemnation in proportion to culpability, how can increased
risk for which the individual is not culpable justify more severe punishment? Alternately, if culpability or risk provide alternative bases for increasing the severity of punishment, why does Anderson's lack of sufficient culpability preclude capital punishment regardless of the severity of
risk?
Davis is fully culpable for his offense and subject to a severe sentence
because he manifests no disorder of comprehension, reasoning, or other
capacities that are required to direct his behavior through the exercise of
responsible agency within the boundaries set by law. The judgment that
he is dangerous by virtue of his tendency to commit crimes of violence
provides an aggravating factor in sentencing with no mitigating effect because the characteristics that render him likely to engage in further violence, such as callousness and remorselessness, do not interfere with his
capacity to direct his behavior through the exercise of responsible agency.
These characteristics might reflect a lack of motivation to refrain from
criminal behavior, but they do not impair the ability to direct his behavior
through the exercise of responsible agency. 99
Anderson qualifies for the insanity defense because his impairment
prevented him from directing the conduct constituting the offense with
which he was charged through the application of minimally adequate capacities of responsible agency. Similarly, that impairment provides the
basis for the judgments that he remains likely to engage in further criminal
99.

Schopp & Slain, supranote 91, at 263-73.
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violence and that he will engage in that violence in a state of impairment
that will prevent him from applying the capacities of responsible agency to
the decisions to engage in that violence. Thus, he lacks the capacities
needed to fulfill the requirements of criminal responsibility for the instant
offense, for anticipated future offenses, and for inflicting the elevated risk
of such offenses on the public.
Cook resembles Davis, rather than Anderson, insofar as both Cook
and Davis committed their predicate crimes while possessing the capacities
of criminal responsibility. Cook resembles Anderson and differs from
Davis, however, insofar as the basis for the judgment of elevated risk reflects the prognosis of severe impairment expected to render Cook prone
to engage in violence for which he will not be criminally responsible.
Thus, Cook is criminally responsible for the immediate crime because he
was able to bring the capacities of responsible agency to bear on the behavior constituting that offense, but the characteristics that support the
expectation of future violence suggest that such conduct would not justify
criminal punishment and condemnation for that conduct. To the extent
that risk provides the basis for sentencing, Cook resembles Anderson
rather than Davis because he represents the risk of future harmful conduct
for which he will be neither criminally responsible nor an appropriate subject of condemnation. Insofar as Cook's culpability for the immediate
crime is not sufficient to justify the condemnation inherent in capital punishment, the risk of future criminal behavior for which he would not be
responsible cannot justify that condemnation.
One can imagine circumstances in which the elevated risk of criminal
violence for which Cook would not be responsible might provide the basis
for the increased condemnation inherent in increased punishment. Suppose, for example, that Cook engaged in drug abuse with a substance that
generates a high probability of psychological deterioration into a state of
delusional fear and violence. Suppose also that Cook was fully aware that
this substance had this effect. If he continued to abuse the drug, experienced the expected pattern of deterioration, and engaged in violence
driven by delusional fear, he would be unable to exercise the capacities of
responsible agency at the time of the violent conduct, but he would remain
subject to condemnation for knowingly creating the circumstances that
generated the risk and the resultant violence.1°° A less extreme example
of a similar process may occur relatively frequently when individuals
commit crimes of violence when intoxicated with substances such as alcohol or methamphetamine which may make it more difficult for them to
moderate their anger, impulsiveness, or other inclinations toward violence.
Some empirical evidence suggests that research participants do not grant
100.
People v. Decina, 138 N.E. 2d 799 (1956). The specific facts of Decina differ from those
discussed here, but the underlying principle is similar in that the offender is culpable for prior behavior that culpably created the risk, rather than for the immediate harmful behavior.
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mitigating weight to impairment induced by substance abuse.'' This refusal to grant mitigating force may reflect the judgment that intoxicated
offenders remain fully culpable for their conduct because they knowingly
generated the impairment of their own capacities and thus are responsible
for creating the risk that they would be less able to rationally direct their
violent inclinations.
The examples of Anderson, Cook, and Davis suggest that dangerousness is qualitatively sufficient as an aggravating factor in criminal sentencing when the offender is responsible for the predicate crime and for the
elevated risk of further criminal violence he inflicts upon the public. He is
responsible for inflicting that risk on the public if the characteristics that
render him dangerous are such that he would be responsible for the further
violence reflecting those characteristics or if he is responsible for generating the circumstances that would render him not responsible or less responsible for that violence reflecting those characteristics.
D. Applying the Framework
Cook represents a relatively unrealistic example of an offender who
can reasonably be understood to be less culpable but more dangerous than
other offenders who commit similar offenses. Consider the alternative
case of East as an offender who presents the sentencer with a two-edged
sword. East was arrested and convicted for a murder committed during an
armed robbery of a convenience store. East entered the store with a knife,
gave the cashier a bag and told her to give him all of the money. The
cashier became frightened and began screaming just as a car pulled into
the parking area. East stabbed the cashier "to shut her up" and ran from
the store as the driver of the car approached the door. The police arrested
him shortly thereafter attempting to hide in an alley.
East was nineteen years old at the time of the offense. He dropped out
of high school after a history of failing classes and doing poorly in special
education programs. He has consistently achieved intelligence scores in
the high seventies that place him just above the range of mental retardation.' 0 2 He has been evaluated as suffering learning and behavioral disorders associated with impulsivity, hyperactivity, and failure to direct or
sustain attention.10 3 He has a history of juvenile offenses involving impulsive violence, including violence in juvenile detention that resulted in extended duration of detention. He was recently released from the county
jail after serving six months for assault. He would have been eligible for
release after three months, but he served the full six months due to disci101.
COLUM.
102.
103.

Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Migation in CapitalCases:What Do Jurors Think?, 98
L. REv. 1538, 1565 (1998) (addressing intoxication by alcohol or drugs).
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 53, at 41-49 (Mental Retardation).
Id. at 85-93 (Attention Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder).

2006]

Capital Sentencing

plinary violations, including a fight with another inmate and an assault
against a corrections officer who intervened in that fight with the other
inmate. Psychological consultation completed prior to trial for the current
offense resulted in a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder with impulsive and explosive features.' °4
East is eligible for capital punishment because he fulfills at least one
statutory aggravating factor, but mitigating factors also apply.10 5 Arguably, East's limited intelligence, impulsiveness, and labile emotional responsiveness render him less culpable than an unimpaired offender who
commits similar offenses because his impairment interferes with his ability
to direct his behavior through the application of practical reasoning. Arguably, however, these same characteristics render him more dangerous
than an unimpaired offender in that they render him less able to anticipate
consequences, learn from experience, or respond to situational contingencies, including those he would encounter when incarcerated. If dangerousness is an independent justification for increased punishment, including
capital punishment, then East is a reasonable candidate for capital punishment because his impairment renders him likely to engage in continued
violence, including violence committed while incarcerated. If dangerousness that justifies increased punishment must be associated with conduct
for which the actor is criminally responsible, East qualifies as dangerous
because he is criminally responsible for the predicate offense and he would
be expected to be criminally responsible for any future injurious behavior.
As discussed previously, however, criminal sentencing differs from
the insanity defense in that criminal responsibility for the purpose of the
insanity defense constitutes a threshold standard. In contrast, criminal punishment that expresses condemnation appropriate to the offender and offense requires assessment of the degree to which the considerations at issue affect the offender's ability to bring the capacities of responsible
agency to bear on his decision to engage in criminal conduct. Thus, the
assessment of dangerousness for the purpose of criminal sentencing requires evaluation of the manner and degree to which the characteristics
that render the individual dangerous limit that individual's ability to bring
the capacities of responsibility to bear on the decision to engage in the
anticipated violence.
Davis is dangerous due to demonstrated propensities and characteristics that render him likely to engage in further violence for which he
would remain fully responsible because those characteristics do not interfere with his ability to exercise the capacities of responsible agency in the
decision to engage in that violent conduct. Cook is dangerous due to the
anticipated deterioration, for which he will not be responsible, to a state of
104.
Id. at 701-06 (Antisocial Personality Disorder).
105.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)(e), (f) (aggravating factors), 210.6(4)(g) (mitigating factors)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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severe impairment that will prevent him from directing his conduct
through the exercise of those capacities. Thus, Davis's dangerousness is
qualitatively sufficient for the purpose of justifying enhanced punishment,
but Cook's is not. A reasonable sentencer might plausibly conclude that
East's history of impulsive aggression is partially due to impairment that
interferes with his ability to apply the capacities of responsible agency to
his violent conduct, although not to the degree that it precludes criminal
responsibility. This sentencer must evaluate the manner and degree to
which East's impairment affects attribution of responsibility for the instant
crime, for the anticipated future violence, and for inflicting the ongoing
threat of harm upon the public.
East's impairment constitutes a two-edged sword in that it provides a
reasonable basis for the judgment that East's disorder renders him less
culpable but more dangerous than an unimpaired offender who commits
similar offenses. His impairment qualifies for the aggravating factor of
dangerousness insofar as it supports the inference that he presents an elevated risk of further culpable criminal conduct. His impairment also provides a reasonable basis for the judgment that East qualifies for mitigation
insofar as that impairment renders him less culpable than an unimpaired
offender for his past violence and for inflicting the threat of further violence upon the public. In the absence of additional evidence suggesting
that East has culpably contributed to his own impairment through substance abuse or some alternative form of behavior, there is no evidence
that he has culpably contributed to the conditions that impair his°6 ability to
direct his conduct through the capacities of responsible agency.'
As with many other judgments of culpability and of the quantitative
sufficiency of risk to qualify as dangerousness for a particular legal purpose, we have no formula that provides the basis for a precise measurement. Consider, for example, the reasonable inference that East's impairment reduces his ability to accurately recognize situational contingencies and direct his conduct to avoid unwanted consequences. Some court
opinions apparently interpret the deterrence function of punishment to apply only to those who engage in cold calculation regarding their crimes.
These opinions suggest that deterrence cannot serve as a legitimate penal
purpose for punishment of impaired offenders because deterrence requires
that offenders engage in premeditation, deliberation, or cost-benefit analysis before committing their crimes. °7 The opinions also reveal, however,
that Penry, Atkins, and Simmons all consciously considered the risk of
being caught and punished in their decisions to commit their capital of-

106.
See supra notes 99-101 and text accompanying.
107.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319-20
(2002).
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fenses.10 8 Impairment may decrease an individual's ability to accurately
estimate the probability of being apprehended and punished under various
circumstances, but it is not at all clear that such impairment, in contrast to
impairment that renders an individual less able to recognize the gravity of
his crime or less able to direct his behavior through reasoning, should be
understood as having a mitigating effect. As ordinarily understood, mitigation attaches to characteristics or circumstances that render an offender
less culpable for his offense but not to circumstances that merely render
the offender a less efficient criminal. 1°9
Reasonable sentencers might conclude that East's combination of low
intelligence and susceptibility to sudden anger and impulsiveness mitigates
his culpability for the instant offense or for the ongoing threat he represents. These sentencers might conclude that this combination of factors
renders it particularly difficult for him to bring his limited abilities of
practical reasoning to bear on his decision to engage in aggressive conduct
in circumstances that elicit anger. Thus, they might conclude that he is
less blameworthy for the failure to do so. Other reasonable sentencers
might conclude that this impairment is not mitigating, or not sufficiently
mitigating to preclude capital punishment, because his behavior was so
clearly wrongful that it required no complex or subtle comprehension or
reasoning to recognize that he should refrain from such action. The lack
of precise guidance regarding these questions reflects the more general
lack of precise formulas for the evaluation of culpability or of dangerousness generally. Sentencers must consider the aggravating and mitigating
evidence in deciding whether East qualifies for the condemnation inherent
in capital punishment or in some lesser punishment.
One important component of this sentencing process requires assessment of the qualitative sufficiency of the risk. The sentencer must decide
whether the characteristics that render East likely to engage in violence
justify the elevated condemnation inherent in increased punishment. Insofar as the sentencer concludes that these characteristics interfere with
East's ability to direct his conduct through the capacities of responsible
agency, that conclusion provides good reason to conclude that East is less
culpable for the initial offense and for inflicting ongoing risk on the public
than would be an unimpaired offender who committed similar crimes.
Thus, the sentencer must make a judgment regarding whether and to what
degree the risk presented by East is qualitatively sufficient to justify increased punishment.

108.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 556; Atkbs, 536 U.S. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989).
109.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (8th ed. 2004) (mitigation of punishment).
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E. Conclusion
As interpreted here, a determination that a particular individual or act
is dangerous for a particular legal purpose requires judgments of quantitative and qualitative sufficiency. These judgments are inherently justificatory in that dangerousness requires risk sufficient in quantity and quality to
justify the legal liability or intervention at issue. For the purpose of justifying criminal punishment, the increased risk must be associated with culpability in a manner that justifies the condemnation inherent in the type
and severity of punishment at issue. The degree and circumstances of risk
that qualify as quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient may vary from
case to case, partially because the condemnation that is justified by culpability independent of dangerousness can vary. In cases of extreme culpability, reasonable sentencers might conclude that a relatively low degree of
risk is sufficient to qualify as dangerousness in a jurisdiction that requires
a finding of dangerousness as a necessary condition for capital punishment
or for some other level of punishment. 1 °
The risk presented by Cook, for example, arguably is insufficient to
justify the condemnation inherent in capital punishment. This risk is insufficient for this purpose because Cook's culpability for his crime is not
sufficient to justify capital punishment, and the ongoing risk he presents is
not qualitatively sufficient to justify increased condemnation. An offender
who was fully culpable for vicious murders of children, in contrast, might
present a relatively low risk of future harm in prison because he would
lack access to children."' A reasonable sentencer in a jurisdiction that
required a finding of dangerousness as a condition necessary to render an
offender eligible for capital punishment might conclude, however, that
even the minimal risk that such an offender would escape or redirect his
violence toward other prisoners or prison staff would be sufficient to justify capital punishment. The sentencer might reach this conclusion because this offender's culpability for the offenses for which he had been
convicted justifies the condemnation inherent in capital punishment. Thus,
the sentencer might conclude that any risk of further violence is quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to constitute dangerousness for this purpose because the offender's culpability for the crime justifies the condemnation inherent in capital punishment. The sentencer might conclude,
therefore, that the offender should bear the full cost of any remaining risk.
As previously discussed, some Supreme Court opinions apparently require that punishment serves some legitimate penal purpose, but others
apparently require punishment in proportion to culpability. It remains
110.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that address dangerousness but
provide no clear threshold of risk that qualifies as sufficient).
111.
State v. Joubert, 399 N.W.2d 237, 241-43, 249-52 (Neb. 1986) (describing an offender who
inflicted extreme harm on children).
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unclear whether the latter opinions require punishment in proportion to
culpability or set proportionality to culpability as a limit on the severity of
punishment.' 12 Sentencing provisions that address dangerousness as a
distinct criterion for capital punishment or as a sentencing factor appear to
conflict with these opinions because they apparently authorize increased
severity of punishment in response to dangerousness, independent of increased culpability. The analysis presented in this section advances an
interpretation of dangerousness as qualitatively sufficient for the purpose
of criminal sentencing that resolves this apparent conflict because it limits
such dangerousness to risk that the offender is criminally responsible for
inflicting on others. Thus, dangerousness increases the severity of punishment only insofar as the offender is legitimately subject to the increased
condemnation inherent in more severe punishment because he is responsible for inflicting that risk on the public. I make no claim that this analysis
resolves the ambiguity regarding the interpretation of the opinions requiring punishment in proportion to culpability. Neither does it resolve the
ongoing debate regarding the moral justification, or lack thereof, for capital punishment. I claim only that this interpretation of qualitative sufficiency renders coherent the statutes and Court opinions that require sentencing in proportion to culpability and accept dangerousness as a sentencing factor.
VII. EXPERT TESTIMONY, DANGEROUSNESS, AND CAPITAL SENTENCING

A. Expert Testimony Relevant to DangerousnessGenerally
The previously discussed criticisms of expert testimony regarding dangerousness for the purpose of capital sentencing often frame that testimony
as predictions of future violence or of future dangerousness or as expert
opinions that an individual is dangerous.' 13 I have previously argued that
a determination of dangerousness for a specific legal purpose is not a prediction of harm but rather an estimate of risk and a judgment that this risk
is sufficient to justify a particular decision. Opinions that individuals are,
or are not, dangerous always exceed the expertise of expert witnesses because these decisions require justificatory judgments." 4 Those arguments
reflect the finding of quantitative sufficiency required for a determination
of dangerousness. That is, the judgment that a person is or is not dangerous for a specified legal purpose requires an estimate of the risk presented
by that person and a judgment that this risk is sufficient to justify the legal
intervention or liability at issue. 1 5 Expert witnesses legitimately testify
112.
113.
114.
115.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IVA.
ScHOPP, supra note 58, at 215-23; see supra Part VE.
See supra Part VE.
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within their range of expertise as defined by the knowledge, skill, experi1 16
ence, training, or education that qualifies them as expert witnesses.
Appropriately educated and experienced clinicians or social scientists may
have expertise relevant to the empirical aspects of risk assessment and
management. Insofar as the relevant information is available, that expertise can include risk assessment involving the likelihood that the individual
will cause harm in the circumstances and the severity of the harm that is
likely. It might also include testimony addressing protective factors and
risk management strategies that might reduce risk in specified circumstances.
In the context of a judicial hearing, however, the judgment that this
risk is sufficient to justify the intervention or liability at issue requires
justificatory reasoning involving such factors as the degree and type of
risk required to justify intrusion into liberty and the most defensible distribution of risk and error. These justificatory components of the analysis
extend beyond the range of expertise that qualifies clinicians or social scientists as expert witnesses regarding risk assessment and management.
These judgments fall within the responsibility of the judge or jury. Experts can legitimately provide descriptive and explanatory testimony relevant to a determination that these individuals are or are not dangerous, but
their expertise does not extend to these justificatory judgments. Thus,
putatively expert opinions that these individual are or are not dangerous
necessarily extend beyond the range of professional expertise. For this
reason, attorneys should not ask experts for opinions that individuals are
or are not dangerous; judges should not allow7 such questions or testimony;
1
and experts should not offer such opinions.'
In some circumstances, clinicians might make professional judgments
that include justificatory components. Those providing treatment and case
management on an inpatient ward, for example, must decide whether a
committed individual has experienced treatment effects that reduce the risk
of violence to a degree that justifies home visits. These decisions require
risk assessment and management through the application of the knowledge
and skills that are intrinsic to the profession. They also require justificatory judgments that the treatment effects have reduced risk to a degree that
justifies accepting the risk involved in the visits at issue. These latter
justificatory judgments are delegated in that they require social judgment
that does not fall within the expertise of the profession. Rather, society
delegates these judgments to the members of certain professions in certain
circumstances." 8 The role of expert witness differs from the treatment
role, however, in that the expert witness is called to testify within the
range of specialized expertise, and those justificatory judgments are prop116.
117.

118.

FED. R. EVID. 702 (expert testimony).
SCHOPP, supra note 58, at 220-23.
Id. at 253-57.
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erly reserved for the court or jury rather than delegated to the expert witness. 119
Qualitative sufficiency resembles quantitative sufficiency in that determinations of each extend beyond the expertise of an expert witness.
Qualitative sufficiency also resembles quantitative sufficiency in that an
expert may have relevant information that falls within the range of expertise. A determination of qualitative sufficiency requires more than an estimate of the probability and severity of risk. It requires that the judge or
jury make a determination that the individual generates that risk in a manner that fulfills the requirements of the specific legal liability or intervention at issue. 2 ° In order to make this determination, they need explanation
regarding the manner in which the individual generates the risk at issue.
Testimony that informs this determination would provide as much explanation as possible regarding the properties of the person and circumstances
that generate the risk and the manner in which these properties generate
that risk insofar as information is available to the expert that can assist the
decisionmaker in understanding how the individual's psychological impairment contributes to the risk generated. For example, testimony that
explains this causal influence can assist the decisionmaker in deciding
whether the individual qualifies for civil commitment under a provision
that limits commitment to those who are dangerous due to mental illness. 121
Recall C and E, who fired guns in circumstances that endangered others but who elicited different conclusions regarding reckless endangerment
because E but not C fired in circumstances that involved an unjustified
risk.122 Consider a third individual, F, who finds a gun in an alley, takes
it to an empty lot, and fires it at a wooden fence that separates the lot from
the back yards of the houses that border the lot. F is also charged with
reckless endangerment for firing the gun in circumstances that endanger
the people living behind the fence. A psychologist who evaluates the defendant finds that he suffers moderate mental retardation. 2 3 An evaluation
of his cognitive impairment might support the interpretation that he is unable to recognize risks associated with his conduct that any person of ordinary intelligence would almost certainly recognize. Thus, a description of
his cognitive impairment and an explanation regarding the manner in
which it limits his ability to recognize the likely but removed consequences of his conduct might support an inference that although F created
an unreasonable risk, he did not consciously disregard that risk. Rather, F
never recognized the risk to those who lived behind the fence because he
119.

FED. R. EVID. 702 (expert testimony); SCHOPP, supranote 58, at 257-61.
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See supra Part VE.
See supra Part VB.
See supra Part VD.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 53, at 43 (moderate mental retardation).
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could not see them. Due to his impairment, F does not draw inferences
that would be readily apparent to an individual of ordinary intellectual
functioning.
Such testimony describing and explaining the manner in which F's impairment affects the process through which he generates the risk could
provide the judge or jury with important information relevant to their determination whether he generated the unreasonable risk in a manner that
justifies criminal liability for reckless endangerment. Here, as in the contexts of civil commitment or civil negligence discussed previously, a determination that the individual is dangerous for the specific legal purpose
at issue requires not only an estimate of the probability and severity of the
risk and a judgment that this risk is sufficient in quantity for this legal
purpose, but also a determination that it is qualitatively sufficient by the
standards appropriate to this legal purpose.124
Psychological experts can provide expert testimony that is relevant to
the matter at issue and within their range of expertise. When appropriate
information is available, this can include testimony regarding risk assessment, including the probability and severity of the risk and explanations
regarding the manner in which the person generates that risk. This testimony might legitimately address risk assessment and management in various circumstances. In a particular case, for example, an expert might
have access to an individual's history that allows the expert to offer an
opinion that this individual represents an elevated risk in circumstances in
which his compliance with treatment is not monitored and a reduced risk
in circumstances in which he is subject to a monitored treatment program.
However, expert testimony cannot legitimately extend to an opinion that
this individual is or is not dangerous in general or in any particular circumstances. Judges or juries must make these determinations because the
justificatory judgments regarding quantitative and qualitative sufficiency
necessarily fall beyond the range of psychological expertise.
B. Capital Sentencing
As written, capital sentencing provisions that address dangerousness as
a sentencing criterion or factor provide no formula for the sentencer to
1 25
apply in deciding whether the offender satisfies these criteria or factors.
According to the conception of dangerousness presented here, sentencers
should explicitly recognize that in making the determinations that specific
offenders are or are not dangerous, they are making the judgments that
these offenders represent risk that is or is not sufficient to justify capital
sentences. Understood in this manner, these provisions charge sentencers
124.
125.

See supra Part V.
See supra Part IVA.
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with estimating the risk of further criminal violence by the offenders to be
sentenced, and with deciding whether that risk is quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to provide good justificatory reasons to bring capital
sentences.
As discussed in Part VID, these sentencers must make difficult decisions on the basis of a broad range of information with sentencing instructions that provide general guidelines and sentencing factors rather than
clear rules or criteria. Sentencers must estimate risk and culpability, and
they must make justificatory judgments regarding the significance of each.
In some cases, the evidence might support the inference that certain characteristics render the offender less culpable but higher risk than other offenders who commit similar offenses. Sentencers who evaluate such information have a legal obligation to consider and give effect to all relevant
mitigating evidence, but they have no formula to apply to sentencing decisions.1 26 Thus, these decisions must reflect to a substantial degree the
sentencers' intuitive and experiential judgment regarding the justification
provided by all relevant evidence. Expert testimony that provides as much
relevant description and explanation as possible can assist these sentencers. Insofar as information regarding base rates, risk factors, protective factors, behavioral history, or other relevant considerations is available and within the expertise of the expert witness, descriptive and explanatory testimony regarding that information, its significance for risk
assessment and management, and empirical inferences supported by it
would fall within the range of legitimate expert testimony.
Expert testimony that takes a misleading form of prediction or of putatively expert opinions that the offenders are or are not dangerous can undermine the ability of sentencers to discharge their responsibilities by misleading them about the justificatory judgments they make. Expert testimony in the form of putatively expert opinions that offenders would or
would not be dangerous or present continuing threats to others in prison
for the purpose of capital sentencing would extend beyond the range of
psychological expertise. Such opinions would require judgments that the
risk presented by the offenders to be sentenced was or was not quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to justify the sentence at issue. 27 Such
testimony raises at least two concerns beyond the problem of violating the
limits of expertise. First, some sentencers may misunderstand such testimony as dispositive regarding the dangerousness issue, thus failing to recognize or discharge their responsibility to make justificatory judgments of
quantitative and qualitative sufficiency. Second, if sentencers understand
that testimony as dispositive regarding dangerousness, that error may distort their evaluation of culpability by rendering it less likely that they will
126.
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recognize the need to ask to what degree the offenders are responsible for
the risk they inflict on others. Finally, insofar as the expert testimony
regarding dangerousness rests upon actuarial risk assessment, it raises
serious questions about the legitimacy of making criminal sentencing decisions on the basis of population data,
rather than upon individualized as28
offender.
specific
the
of
sessment
Consider, for example, the concerns raised by the articles discussed in
Section IVA. The first concern involves expert testimony that relies on
risk assessment instruments that have not been validated as predictors of
violence in prison. 29 Understood as the claim that experts cannot predict
dangerousness or offer an opinion that the individual will or will not be
dangerous or engage in violence, these articles are correct for reasons that
apply to expert testimony regarding dangerousness generally. That is, a
determination of dangerousness is not a prediction, and any determination
that an individual is or is not dangerous requires justificatory judgments of
quantitative and qualitative sufficiency that fall beyond the range of psychological expertise. Insofar as experts offer accurate descriptive and explanatory testimony, however, they can testify that this individual scores
in a range that has been associated with elevated levels of violence in the
community. Such testimony should include discussion of a variety of
qualifying considerations. These could include, for example, explanation
of the levels and severity of the violence found in the research, the distinction between detected violence and actual violence, the differences in
population and circumstances between the community samples and the
prison samples, and other relevant considerations. Such testimony would
also include discussion of the concerns raised by the application of population data to individuals who share some but not all properties with the
population. The weight the sentencer grants the testimony and the degree
of risk and certainty the sentencer considers appropriate for sentencing are
determinations for the sentencer that extend beyond the expertise of the
witness.
At least one article explicitly raises concerns regarding the prejudicial
effect of the term "psychopath." 1 30 This raises an important and relevant
consideration for the judge regarding admissibility.' 3' The offer of proof
should include a description of the evidence that supports the expectation
of prejudicial effect as well as any available evidence regarding the effectiveness of explanatory testimony to correct for this effect. The judge
must make a determination regarding the relative weight of the relevance
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and of the prejudicial effects of the evidence presented in various formats,
including those that do or do not use the term "psychopath."
The second concern addresses base rates of violence in prison that
suggest that any prediction of violence in prison will produce high rates of
false positives.' 3 2 Once again, the appropriate question addresses assessment of risk, rather than prediction of violence. Testimony regarding risk
in prison can include explanations of base rates and false positives. Recognizing that the appropriate form of expert testimony involves description
and explanation, rather than predictions of violence or expert opinions that
the offenders are or are not dangerous, recasts the concern as one regarding accurate communication of the relevant information, rather than as one
of false positives or negatives in dichotomous predictions or categorizations. The third concern addresses expert testimony based on a history of
violence in the community because such violence has not been validated as
a predictor of violence in the prison environment. 3 3 As above, appropriate testimony would discuss the differences in the two environments and
any evidence available regarding the correlation or lack of correlation between detected violence in the community and detected violence in prison.
Insofar as available information allows explanation regarding differences
in correlation for particular types of violence, circumstances, or offenders,
that explanation would be appropriate.
The fourth concern involves testimony regarding dangerousness of offenders who could be housed in special high-security facilities. 3 4 This
concern resembles the third in that both address the reliability of behavior
in one set of circumstances as indicators of risk in different circumstances.
Insofar as relevant information is available, experts can explain the differences in rates and types of violence in the different circumstances. Insofar
as such information is not available, experts can explain that the correlation between prior behavior in other circumstances and likely behavior in
these circumstances is unknown.
These responses to these objections reveal a general pattern. Recognizing that expert testimony regarding risk appropriately involves description and explanation of relevant risk, protective, and management considerations in the circumstances, rather than predictions of violence or putatively expert opinions that individuals are or are not dangerous, alters the
focus of evaluation of proposed testimony. When expert testimony is
framed as predictions or as expert opinions that individuals are, or are not,
dangerous, the ratio of accurate predictions and opinions as compared to
false positives or negatives can seem critical. When expert testimony
takes the form of description and explanation of relevant factors, in contrast, the emphasis shifts to the availability of relevant information and to
132.
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the ability to accurately communicate that information. The ability of sentencers to comprehend and apply complex testimony and the potential for
prejudicial effects are relevant considerations. Insofar as experts have
information relevant to those considerations, that information is relevant to
the admissibility question. Expert opinions that individuals are or are not
dangerous in specified circumstances remain beyond the range of expertise
due to the quantitative and qualitative sufficiency components of such determinations.
C. The FrameworkApplied
Insofar as capital sentencers rest their decisions to apply capital punishment on determinations of dangerousness, they must estimate the risk
presented by the offenders and make justificatory judgments that the characteristics of these offenders that generate risk render them appropriate for
intervention through criminal punishment. That is, insofar as risk provides a basis for more severe punishment than the offender would qualify
for on the basis of culpability assessed without consideration of risk, it
must be risk generated in a manner that justifies the increased condemnation inherent in more severe punishment. Thus, relevant expert testimony
might include estimates of risk in various circumstances, descriptions of
the characteristics of the offender and the circumstances that generate risk,
explanation of the manner in which those factors increase the probability
or severity of risk, and explanation of the manner in which the offender
developed those factors. Such testimony can enhance the ability of the
sentencer to make the justificatory judgment that the offender does or does
not merit increased condemnation for inflicting that risk upon the public.
Insofar as relevant information is available, descriptive and explanatory
testimony of this type might enhance the ability of conscientious sentencers to make justifiable sentencing decisions for offenders such as those
previously discussed. Such testimony might enable sentencers to conclude
that Anderson, Baker, and Cook present risk due to characteristics that
preclude responsibility for the elevated risk or for developing those characteristics. Thus, the increased risk they present does not justify condemnation and punishment beyond that which is justified by their culpability,
or lack thereof, for their crimes.
Davis, in contrast, presents risk due to characteristics that do not impair his capacities for responsible agency either for the predicate offense
or for the ongoing risk he inflicts upon the public. Reasonable sentencers
might conclude that he remains subject to condemnation for his culpable
crime and for the risk of further criminal conduct that he culpably injects
into the public domain. Alternately, these sentencers might conclude that
he resembles the child murderer discussed previously in that his crime
provides sufficient culpability to justify the maximum sentence, and therefore, any risk is sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of dangerous-
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ness because no further basis for condemnation is needed.' 35 Finally,
some sentencers who are persuaded by the argument that the failure to
experience moral emotions precludes or reduces culpability might interpret
this testimony as mitigating. 36 The critical point is that descriptive and
explanatory testimony falls within the expertise of psychological experts
and enhances the ability of the sentencers to fulfill their responsibilities
without distorting the boundary between the legitimate functions of witnesses and sentencers.
East presents a difficult case because his predicate crime and the increased risk he presents reflect impairment of his ability to apply the capacities of responsible agency. This impairment does not preclude culpability and condemnation but may justify lesser condemnation than would
be appropriate for an unimpaired offender who commits similar crimes.
The sentencer must weigh the significance of this impairment in the absence of any clear formula or decision rule. At least part of this process
involves understanding of the impairment and its effects on East's ability
to apply comprehension and reasoning in the circumstances. Thus, expert
testimony that provides thorough explanation of the impairment and of the
manner in which it can affect decision making in various circumstances
can provide relevant assistance to the sentencer. The sentencer's task remains difficult, and the most defensible resolution to that task may remain
legally and morally controversial. A sentencer who concludes that East's
impairment constitutes a two-edged sword must be able to consider and
give effect to the mitigating edge. Supreme Court doctrine provides no
clear direction for the sentencer who must make a sentencing decision
regarding the ultimate significance of this evidence for East's sentence.
By presenting testimony that falls within the domain of expertise, however, the expert can provide any assistance that is legitimately available
and avoid distorting the boundary between the responsibilities of the expert and the sentencer.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The contemporary debate regarding capital punishment raises a complex series of legal, moral, and empirical questions. Many of these questions are relevant to the criminal justice system generally, but they draw
intense reaction in the context of capital punishment. Courts and commentators tend to focus on either the legal, moral, or empirical concerns, but
serious attempts to address these questions often require careful attention
to the complex relationships among these concerns. The Supreme Court's
opinions addressing the legitimate penal purposes of punishment appar135.
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ently import the moral inquiry into the legal doctrine. As discussed in
Section III, however, the interpretation of and justification for this doctrine remain unclear. It is difficult to articulate the most defensible approach to evidence that can function as a two-edged sword partially because we lack a clear interpretation of and justification for this doctrine.
Thus, we are unable to clearly articulate the approach to two-edged sword
evidence that would most accurately apply to this legal doctrine or to the
moral justification for this doctrine.
Similarly, attempts to define the limits of expert testimony regarding
dangerousness for the purpose of capital sentencing tend to direct attention
toward the available empirical data. Although the empirical research provides an important component in a comprehensive analysis of the most
defensible form and limits of expert testimony, a fully satisfactory analysis
must integrate this research with the applicable legal conception of dangerousness that reflects the justification for criminal punishment generally
and for capital punishment specifically. The analysis presented in this
article contends that one cannot identify the appropriate range and form of
expert testimony for this purpose unless one addresses a complex set of
considerations including at least the available empirical research regarding
risk assessment and management, the form and range of the proposed testimony, the legal conception of dangerousness applicable to this specific
legal purpose, the applicable legal doctrine, and the justifiable role that
doctrine fulfills in defining the legitimate purpose and limits of capital
punishment. This analysis represents one step in an ongoing effort to pursue the integration of these moral, legal, and empirical domains of inquiry
regarding capital punishment.
This analysis supports the conclusion that expert witnesses should not
make predictions of dangerousness for the purpose of capital sentencing
for the same reason that they should not make such predictions for other
legal purposes and for the same reason that courts and juries should not
make such predictions. Judgments of dangerousness for specific legal
purposes are not predictions. Rather, they are estimates of the risk in the
circumstances and judgments that this risk is quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to justify the legal liability or intervention at issue. Similarly, expert witnesses should not offer putatively expert opinions that
offenders are or are not dangerous for the purpose of capital sentencing
because judgments that individuals are or are not dangerous for this or any
other legal purpose require justificatory judgments of quantitative and
qualitative sufficiency that extend beyond the expert's range of expertise.
Recognizing that determinations of dangerousness involve empirical
and justificatory components enables expert witnesses to provide a range
of relevant descriptive and explanatory testimony that falls within their
scope of expertise and provides important information to sentencers who
must combine the empirical estimate of risk with the necessary justificatory judgments. The precise range and form of that testimony can vary
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with the circumstances, the available information, the specific legal purpose at issue, and the judge's evaluation of the probative and prejudicial
potential of that testimony.

